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THE TUCKER ACT AND PAYMENT BOND
SURETY'S EQUITABLE CLAIM OF SUBROGATION
POST-BLUE FOX: KEYS TO THE COURTHOUSE
DOORS
Robert J. Duke'
Imagine you are preparing to present a claim against the Government
before a court. Your focus is on supporting the substantive validity of
the claim. Whether the court has jurisdiction to hear the claim, and
whether sovereign immunity bars the claim, are of less concern to the
action because they are seemingly settled issues. On these issues, you
rely on over 100 years of precedent in which courts have heard claims
similar to yours.
Suddenly, you learn that, despite the century of precedent, the court
will not hear your claim. Even more alarming, the court tells you that it
has determined that the cases upon which you relied are not precedent
regarding jurisdiction because they never addressed any jurisdictional
issues. Instead, the court declares that the so-called precedent issue dealt
solely with the substantive merits of a claim. The court has closed the
doors to any relief you had sought. Although this sudden and dramatic
change has an air of Kafka,' the circumstance in this tale is one that
payment bond sureties may have to face after the Supreme Court's
decision in Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc.2
A surety bond is a three party contract in which an obligation owed by
one party (the bond principal) to another (the obligee) is guaranteed by
a third party (the surety). Project owners commonly require surety
* J.D. Candidate, May 2005, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of
America. The author is also Director of Underwriting for The Surety Association of
America (SAA), a trade association of approximately 550 companies licensed to write
surety and fidelity bonds. The author wishes to express his gratitude for the support of
Lynn Schubert, President of SAA, and Edward Gallagher, SAA's General Counsel.
1. See generally FRANZ KAFKA, The Metamorphosis, in SELECTED SHORT STORIES
OF FRANZ KAFKA 19 (Willa & Edwin Muir trans., Random House 1952) (1936). While
the author is not suggesting that the scenario is identical to changing into a "gigantic
insect," the change is just as dramatic. Id.
2. 525 U.S. 255 (1999).
3. 1 JOHN B. FITZGERALD ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF SURETYSHIP 1 (1st ed. 1991).
Suretyship, the guaranteeing of one's debts to another, is an ancient concept that has
existed for thousands of years. The Book of Proverbs cautions against becoming surety
for a stranger. Proverbs 11:15. In The Merchant of Venice, Shakespeare created a unique
surety bond, a pound of flesh, that secured Antonio's repayment of a loan from Shylock.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 1, sc. 3. Fortunately for the
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bonds as security for the completion of a construction contract.4 In this
context, the bond principal is the construction contractor who owes an
obligation to the project owner, the obligee. The surety, usually an
insurance company, secures the obligation, which is the construction of
the project . The contractor provides two bonds: a performance bond
and a payment bond.6  A performance bond guarantees the full and
faithful performance of the contract. A payment bond guarantees that
the contractor will pay its subcontractors and suppliers." The Miller Act'
requires both performance and payment bonds as security on
construction projects over $100,000 on which the Federal Government is
the project owner.' ° The regulatory provisions of the bond requirement
are set forth in the Federal Acquisition Regulations."
author and his colleagues in the surety industry, the type of bond posted today is less
detrimental to one's health. Surety bonds have even played a part in the movie industry.
Movie completion bonds have assured the production of movies such as Driving Miss
Daisy and Malcolm X when the film goes over budget or falls behind schedule. Joanne
Wojcik, Film Guarantors Vie for Top Role After Firm Folds, Bus. INS., Nov. 29, 1993, at 3.
4. In 2001, over $1.9 billion in premiums were paid to purchase bonds that secured
contracts. THE SURETY ASS'N. OF AM., CLASSIFICATION EXPERIENCE SUMMARY:
FIDELITY AND SURETY. For more information regarding construction surety bonds, see
SURETY INFORMATION OFFICE, at http://www.sio.org (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
5. See Stewart R. Duke & Mary Jeanne Anderson, How Contract Surety Bonds Are
Underwritten, in THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP 49, 49 (Edward G. Gallagher ed., 2d ed. 2000).
In their article, Duke and Anderson concisely describe the wide-ranging obligations that a
contractor takes on when undertaking a construction contract:
These undertakings are performed by contractors who tell the owner .... " I will
build that project according to a set of plans and specifications you provide and I
will see that all the bills are paid for all the material and labor that goes into that
project. Further, I will build it for a firm price that I have 'estimated' today,
regardless of what it actually costs me to do it. I will sign a contract telling you
that I will build this project within a given time for a pre-determined price even
though the project may take one, two or three years longer to complete than
anticipated."
Id.
6. FITZGERALD, supra note 3, at 36.
7. THE SURETY ASs'N. OF AM., GLOSSARY: FIDELITY AND SURETY 24 (1997).
8. Id. at 20.
9. 40 U.S.C.A. §§ 3131-3133 (Supp. 2004). The Miller Act's impact on a
subcontractor's ability to sue the Government was an issue in Blue Fox. Dep't of the
Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 264 (1999). The Supreme Court stated that the right
to sue on a payment bond, as granted by the Miller Act, serves as the subcontractor's sole
recourse for nonpayment since it may not sue the Government directly. Id.
10. 40 U.S.C.A. § 3131(b) (Supp. 2004). A predecessor to the Miller Act was the
Heard Act, which was enacted in 1894. ch. 280, 28 Stat 278 (1894). The Heard Act
provided that any person entering into a contract with the United States was required to
execute "the usual penal bond,... with the additional obligations that such contractor or
contractors shall promptly make payments to all persons supplying him or them [with]
labor and materials." Id. at 278. The House report accompanying the legislation noted
that the United States had been requiring a bond on its construction projects to protect
[Vol. 54:267
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A significant function of a surety bond is to protect the owner
financially in the event the contractor fails to perform or fails to pay its
subcontractors and suppliers." If the contractor defaults, the surety steps
in and provides a remedy in accordance with the terms and conditions of
the surety bond. 3 A surety could remedy a default under a performance
bond by undertaking completion of the construction contract. 4 A surety
remedies a default under a payment bond by paying subcontractors and
suppliers.'" Unlike other forms of insurance, a surety writes a bond
expecting no losses. 6 In order to mitigate any losses it does incur, a
surety seeks to obtain the balance of funds owed by the project owner in
order to undertake completion or pay the subcontractors and suppliers. 7
the United States against the default of performance. H.R. REP. NO. 53-97, at 1 (1893).
However, payment of subcontractors and suppliers was not an obligation covered under
the bond. Id. The Heard Act established this "additional obligation" of payment and
gave subcontractors and suppliers a direct right of action under the bond. 28 Stat. at 278.
However, two obligations (performance and payment) under the same bond created
significant administrative difficulties for a subcontractor in making a claim. H.R. REP. No.
74-1263, at 2 (1935). The Miller Act House report noted that under the Heard Act,
subcontractors encountered "undue delay, with resultant hardships, in the collection of
moneys due them by suits on bonds." Id. at 1. Moreover, the United States had priority in
making a claim under the bond. Id. at 2. The Miller Act remedied these problems by
requiring two separate bonds: one covering the performance obligation and one covering
the payment obligation. Id. As a result, subcontractors and suppliers with claims for
nonpayment arc no longer forced to compete with the United States' performance claims.
11. 48 C.F.R. § 28.102-2(b) addresses the amount of the bond required by the Miller
Act. It provides that the performance bond and payment bond must each be in the
amount of 100% of the original contract price. 48 C.F.R. § 28.102-2(b) (2003).
12. Lynn M. Schubert, Why Obligees Buy Bonds, in THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP, supra
note 5, at 41, 43.
13. Id. at 43 ("The most immediately attractive benefit to the obligee is the obligation
of contract completion.").
14. See generally James J. Mercier & John T. Harris, Rights of Surety in Event of
Default, in THE LAW OF PERFORMANCE BONDS 37 (Lawrence R. Moelmann & John T.
Harris eds., 1999) (describing the surety's options in remedying default: takeover and
project completion, tender of a new contractor, financing the principal, or financial
settlement with the obligee).
15. Kelly Allbritton Katzman, Purpose of the Payment Bond and Who and What Is
Covered, in THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 5, at 147,147.
16. Susan M. Camilli et al., Understanding Workers' Compensation Bonds in Today's
Market, IAIABC J., Fall 2003, at 56, 58 n.4 (2003).
[lI]nsurers write surety bonds expecting no loss. A bond is written successfully if
it is written for a bond principal that will fully perform the obligation or has the
security or financial ability to reimburse the surety for any payments made by the
surety. Experience has shown that the key to a profitable surety line of business
is sound underwriting.
Id.
17. See Edward G. Gallagher, Entitlement to Contract Proceeds [hereinafter
Gallagher, Payment Bonds], in THE LAW OF PAYMENT BONDS 223, 223 (Kevin L. Lybeck
& H. Bruce Shreves eds., 1998); Edward G. Gallagher, Entitlement to Contract Proceeds
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The surety obtains contract balances under a variety of legal theories.'8
The theory relevant to this Comment is equitable subrogation.9
By completing the performance of its principal, the surety is
subrogated to the rights of the parties that benefited from the surety's
20discharge of the obligation. In essence, by performing the obligations of
the defaulted principal, the surety is equitably assigned the rights of the
parties to the bond contract.2 It stands in the shoes of the parties that
21benefited by the surety's discharge of the bonded obligation.
A surety on a bond required by the Miller Act must make its equitable
subrogation claim for contract balances against the Federal
Government. 23 Unlike action against private owners, the surety must
[hereinafter Gallagher, Performance Bonds], in THE LAW OF PERFORMANCE BONDS,
supra note 14, at 61, 61-62.
18. Gallagher, Payment Bonds, supra note 17; Gallagher Performance Bonds, supra
note 17, at 62.
19. Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty explains the concept of
subrogation:
Subrogation is a term used by the law to describe the remedy by which, when the
property of one person [(the surety)] is used to discharge a duty of another [(the
principal)] . . . under such circumstances that the other [(the obligee)] will be
unjustly enriched by the retention thus conferred, the former [(the surety)] is
placed in the position of the obligee . . . . Subrogation does not spring from
contract although it may be confirmed or qualified by contract.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 27 cmt. a (1996). Section
27(1) states: "Upon total satisfaction of the underlying obligation, the secondary obligor
[(the surety)] is subrogated to all rights of the obligee with respect to the underlying
obligation [(e.g., the construction contract)] to the extent that performance of the
secondary obligation [(the surety's performance under the bond)] contributed to the
satisfaction." Id. § 27(1). The right of subrogation involves four elements: "An obligation
of the contractor to the owner; The failure of the contractor to perform that obligation;
Rights in the owner arising from the contractor's failure to perform; The performance by
the surety, pursuant to the suretyship, of the obligation which the contractor has failed to
perform." Daniel Mungall, Jr., The Buffeting of the Subrogation Rights of the Construction
Contract Bond Surety by United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 46 INS. COUNS. J., 607, 607
(1979).
20. George J. Bachrach & John V. Burch, The Surety's Subrogation Rights, in THE
LAW OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 5, at 419, 419-20 ("The surety who completes the
performance of its principal is subrogated to the rights of the creditor and the principal.").
21. Id. at 421. Notably, the concept of subrogation as a surety right was well
established at the time of the Tucker Act's enactment in 1887. A book on equity stated:
It is a settled principle of equity that a surety will be entitled to every remedy
which the creditor has against the principal debtor .... This right of the surety
stands not upon contract, but upon the same principal of natural justice upon
which one surety is entitled to contribution from another.
MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, ELEMENTS OF EQUITY FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS 281 (1879).
22. Bachrach & Burch, supra note 20, at 419 ("Historically, subrogation has been
described as the substitution of one person (the surety) in place of another (the creditor)
with respect to the other's lawful claim or right.").
23. Id. at 449.
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confront the issue of sovereign immunity when asserting a claim against
24the Government. Unless expressly waived, the Government is immune
from valid claims.25 Sovereign immunity is an ancient concept from
English law holding that the King is immune from suit because the King
26is the law. The concept carried over to the Government of the United
States.27 Sovereign immunity protects the Federal Government against
otherwise valid claims.2 8 As contact and interaction between citizens and
the Federal Government grew, Congress relaxed the prohibition and
29
expanded exceptions to its immunity. One such exception is the Tucker
Act.30  The Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity and provides the
Court of Federal Claims with jurisdiction over certain claims.3'
For over a century, since Prairie State Bank v. United States,32 courts
have construed the Tucker Act and precedent as providing jurisdiction
24. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821) ("The
universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the
United States; that the judiciary act does not authorize such suits.").
25. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).
26. See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity,
77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1963).
27. See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 411-12; THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 414
(Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books ed., 1992).
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of
an individual without its consent. . . . The contracts between a nation and
individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no
pretensions to a compulsive force. They confer no right of action, independent
of the sovereign will.
Id. Contra THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (suggesting that
controversies in which the United States is a party should be heard by "national
tribunals").
28. In an article recounting the oral argument of Blue Fox, Blue Fox's attorney,
Thomas Spaulding, noted that Justice Scalia acknowledged the injustice of unsatisfied
claims by stating, "'This happens all the time when people are confronted with the defense
of sovereign immunity. That's the whole beauty of the defense,' . . . 'It lets the
government get off when the government ought to pay."' Thomas F. Spaulding, A
Lawyer's Day at the United States Supreme Court, 63 TEX. B.J. 140, 141 (2000).
29. Paul Frederic Kirgis, Section 1500 and the Jurisdictional Pitfalls of Federal
Government Litigation, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 301, 302 (1997).
30. Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C.).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000). Another provision of the U.S Code provides concurrent
jurisdiction to the U.S district court and the Court of Federal Claims for claims not
exceeding $10,000 and "founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or
any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with
the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort."
Id. § 1346(a)(2).
32. 164 U.S. 227 (1896).
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for sureties' equitable subrogation claims against the Government.31
Other precedent in addition to Prairie State Bank, such as Henningsen v.
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co 3 4 and Pearlman v. Reliance
Insurance Co.,35 have become the cornerstone on which sureties rely to
16
establish their right to sue the Government. Under these cases, sureties
successfully asserted subrogation claims against the Government in order
to obtain funds to complete projects and pay subcontractors. 3' For over
100 years, a right (equitable subrogation) and a remedy (suit against the
government) have existed in these matters.38
However, the recent decisions in Blue Fox and Insurance Co. of the
West v. United States39 have made the surety's ability to assert its
equitable subrogation claim and sue the Government based on Tucker
• 40
Act jurisdiction far less certain. The payment bond surety's ability to
33. See, e.g., Balboa Ins. Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d, 1158, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
("Several cases, although not decided on the merits in favor of a plaintiff surety, have
recognized jurisdiction over a surety's cause." (citing Am. Fid. Fire Ins. Co. v. United
States, 513 F.2d 1375 (Ct. Cl. 1975)); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v United States, 475
F.2d 1377 (Ct. Cl. 1973); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. United States, 319 F.2d 893 (Ct. Cl. 1963);
Newark Ins. Co. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 955 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Home Indem. Co. v.
United States, 376 F.2d 890, 892 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ("The rights of the surety in the final
contract payment have long been recognized."); see also Bachrach & Burch, supra note 20,
at 446-47.
While the Tucker Act is merely jurisdictional, and does not create any
substantive rights, there are a legion of cases in which the federal courts have
found that the Tucker Act provides a vehicle for the surety to assert its claims of
equitable subrogation to the contract funds on federal government contracts.
Id. See generally THE SUBROGATION DATABASE: CASES CONCERNING THE
SUBROGATION OF THE CONTRACT BOND SURETY (George J. Bachrach ed. 1995) (listing
cases awarding contract funds retained by the United States to the surety).
34. 208 U.S. 404 (1908).
35. 371 U.S. 132 (1962).
36. See discussion supra note 33.
37. Pearlman, 371 U.S. at 133, 141-42; Henningsen, 208 U.S. at 404, 410, 412; Prairie
State Bank, 164 U.S. at 231, 240.
38. Prairie State Bank, 164 U.S. at 227-28, 240.
39. 243 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
40. Over the years, sureties have established Tucker Act jurisdiction based on
principles other than equitable subrogation. Marilyn Klinger, The Surety's Right of
Equitable Subrogation Versus the U.S. Government's Right to Sovereign Immunity, 36
TORT & INS. L.J. 23, 28 (2000). For example, sureties have argued that a bond is a three
party contract and, therefore, the surety is in contractual privity with the Government. Id.
Under this argument, Tucker Act jurisdiction is based on the fact that the surety has a
claim founded on an express contract with the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)
(2000). In Balboa, the Federal Circuit found that a surety had standing to sue the United
States based partly on the surety's contractual relationship with the Government. Balboa
Ins. Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d. 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[A] surety, as bondholder,
is as much a party to the Government contract as the contractor."). However, subsequent
case law has undercut this argument. Five years later, the Federal Circuit "clarified" its
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sue the Government under the Tucker Act has not been tested since
Blue Fox.4 When the issue does reach the courts, the payment bond
surety must be prepared to present arguments that will preserve
jurisdiction of its claim under the Tucker Act.
This Comment argues that the Tucker Act contemplated money claims
based on equitable principles, and that the waiver of sovereign immunity
in the Tucker Act is broad enough to permit suit by a payment bond
surety. This Comment will examine the surety's ability to sue the
Government for contract balances under the Tucker Act, pre and post
Blue Fox. Part I of this Comment will discuss the Tucker Act and its
predecessor Act of 1855. It also sets forth a review of the holdings of
Blue Fox and Insurance Co. of the West, and the "cornerstone" cases on
which sureties relied to establish Tucker Act jurisdiction. Part II will
argue that that Blue Fox and Insurance Co. of the West are not authority
for the proposition that payment bond sureties may not sue the
government. Part II also provides an alternative argument establishing a
jurisdictional basis by examining the legislative history of the Tucker
Act.42  Ultimately, this Comment establishes that the drafters of the
Tucker Act contemplated Court of Claims jurisdiction for claims such as
sureties' equitable subrogation claims .
position in Balboa in Ransom v. United States, 900 F.2d 242 (Fcd. Cir. 1990). The Ransom
court explained that Balboa did not place the Government in contractual privity with the
surety but rather the Government was a "stakeholder" for the contact balances. Id. at 245;
see also Admiralty Constr. Inc. v. Dalton, 156 F.3d 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co. v. United States, 909 F.2d 495, 499-500 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting that the
Government is not a party to the performance bond).
And while the government is identified as the intended third-party beneficiary of
the performance bond, it did not sign the bond or undertake any obligation to
Fireman's Fund in it .... Thus, Fireman's Fund is neither the intended third-
party, nor the direct, beneficiary of any promise by the government, whether
contained in the bonded contract or the performance bond.
Id. at 500. Contra Shwarz v. United States, 35 Ct. Cl. 303, 309 (Ct. Cl. 1900) (noting that
two cases heard by the Court of Claims, "both of which went to the Supreme Court," held
that the surety "stands in direct contract relation with the United States"). The cases
referenced by the Shwarz court were Prairie State Bank and United States v. Behan, 110
U.S. 338 (1884). Id. It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court views these cases
as standing for the proposition that the surety is in privity with the Government.
41. In Insurance Co. of the West, the surety was a performance bond surety. 243 F.3d
at 1370.
42. Using legislative history is an acceptable form of statutory interpretation in the
United States. In his book, Christian Mammen states, "[T]he Supreme Court has used
legislative history as a source of guidance in statutory interpretation for virtually its entire
history." CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN AMERICAN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 77 (2002).
43. This Comment will demonstrate that the Tucker Act's drafters contemplated
equitable claims for money damages beyond those grounded on the Constitution, law or
regulation, or express or implied in fact contract. Such claims can be found outside of the
2004]
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I. EQUITABLE SUBROGATION CLAIMS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT -
THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A. The Tucker Act and the Act of 1855
The Tucker Act waives the sovereign immunity of the United States so
persons may bring certain claims against the Government.44 The Tucker
Act provides that necessary express waiver of immunity to open the door
to suit against the Federal Government. A discussion of the background
and circumstances surrounding the Tucker Act and its predecessor is
helpful in understanding the Tucker Act's original intent. When
Congress enacted the Act of 1855,ns it had been beset with a large number
surety context. For example, the Court of Federal Claims has held that a claim founded
upon promissory estoppel is not within the court's jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. See,
e.g., Schuhl v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 207, 210-11 (Cl. Ct. 1983); Biagioli v. United States,
2 Cl. Ct. 304, 308 (Cl. Ct. 1983); Pasternack v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 707, 709 (Cl. Ct.
1987). In Biagioli, the court refused to "broaden the waiver of sovereign immunity" by
granting Tucker Act jurisdiction based on a claim founded on the theory of equitable
estoppel. Biagioli, 2 Cl. Ct. at 308. With a broader reading of the Tucker Act to include
all claims with limited exceptions, claims founded on equitable estoppel could find Tucker
Act jurisdiction. Nevertheless, even if the argument is applied exclusively in the context of
suretyship, jurisdiction over a surety's claim affects more than just surety companies.
From a practical standpoint, if payment bond sureties are blocked from suing the
Government to recover contract funds, the corresponding increased risk of loss would
have two consequences. First, in light of a higher risk of loss, it would prompt the surety
to increase its underwriting parameters and write bonds for only the most financially
secure contractors, limiting the availability of bonds to smaller contractors, and thereby
reducing the number of contractors that can compete for a project. Reduced competition
would then lead to higher project costs. Second, a surety would compensate for the
increased risk by increasing premiums. The two consequences, higher underwriting
parameters and increased premiums, ultimately translate into increased construction costs
for the taxpayer. See Brief of Amicus Curiae The Surety Association of America Urging
Affirmance of the Order of the Court of Federal Claims at 2-3, 17-18, 21-24, Ins. Co. of the
West (No. 00-5039) (noting adverse effects if the court denies jurisdiction of surety claims
against the Government).
If this Court were to adopt the position urged by the United States [(i.e. that the
surety may not sue the Government for contract funds)], it would make it very
difficult for the surety on a federal project to finance a troubled contractor and
thus avoid a default and consequent delay to the project. The type of actions
taken by ICW [(the surety)] to meet its obligations would expose a surety to a
risk of loss not contemplated when the bond was written ....
Id. at 2-3.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000).
45. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (repealed 1887).
[T]he said court shall hear and determine all claims founded upon any law of
Congress, or upon any regulation of an executive department, or upon any
contract, express or implied, with the government of the United States, which
[Vol. 54:267
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of private bills asserting claims against the United States.4 In addition,
the use of private bills to provide individualized relief proved inadequate
from the perspective of the claimant.47 The Act of 1855 established the
Court of Claims as a body to investigate claims within its scope.48
However, all of the court's decisions were subject to review by
Congress's Committee on Claims. 49  Therefore, Congress remained
overburdened with issues regarding private bills.50 Congress passed
various other acts subsequent to the Act of 1855 which rendered the
51
court's decisions final and not subject to Congress's review.
The scope of the Court of Claims' jurisdiction remained largely
unchanged until the passage of the Tucker Act.52 For several years after
the passage of the Act of 1855, private bills continued to inundate
Congress. In 1886, Representative John Tucker proposed legislation
that would expand the scope of the Court of Claims' jurisdiction to
relieve Congress from addressing many of the private bills.54 Tucker's
may be suggested to it by a petition filed therein; and also all claims which may
be referred to said court by either house of Congress.
Id.
46. Kirgis, supra note 29. A private bill was the sole mechanism by which a citizen
could secure relief against the Government before Congress established waivers of
sovereign immunity and jurisdiction in the courts. See id. See generally Note, Private Bills
in Congress, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1684, 1684 (1966) (assessing the constitutionality of
Congress's private lawmaking function). Although rare, private bills for relief exist even
today. For example, in 1996, the U.S. House of Representatives considered House Bill
2894 to pay for the legal expenses of the employees who were fired from the White House
travel office. H.R. 2894, 104th Cong. (1996).
47. In addition to the burdensome nature of private bills, the process involved in their
investigation and resolution has proved highly inadequate. WILSON COWEN ET AL., THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS 8-10 (1978). Between the years 1831-1837, 14,602
private claims were presented to Congress and 8811 were not resolved. Id. at 9. Between
1838 and 1848, only 910 of 17,573 claims were acted upon by both houses of Congress. Id.
at 9-10. Private bills were also viewed as unjust. In a speech concerning a predecessor
statute of the Tucker Act, Representative A.G. Porter noted the "inconvenience and
injustice" to a citizen seeking private relief because Congress did not have time to address
the matter sufficiently. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 123 (1862). Porter
observed, "A business man ordinarily felt that it was better to submit at once to the loss of
his claim than to lose the time, incur the expense, and subject himself to the annoyance
and uncertainty incident to its prosecution in each House of Congress." Id.
48. COWEN, supra note 47, at 15-16.
49. Id. at 18.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 20-25.
52. See id. at 39-40.
53. Id. at 39.
54. See H.R. REP. NO. 49-1077, at 4 (1886). In the House report, Tucker stated:
It is needless to say more than has already been intimated as to the general
policy of this legislation. The large mass of business now before Congress
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legislation proposed to expand jurisdiction beyond that established under
the Act of 1855 to matters involving equity and admiralty.5  The
legislation was similar to the Act of 1855, except for the jurisdictional
provision, "[F]or damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in respect of which
claims the party would be entitled to redress against the United States
either in a court of law, equity, or admiralty if the United States were
su a b le .
'5 6
As originally drafted, the Tucker Act stated:
[T]he Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to hear and
determine the following matters:
First. All claims founded upon the Constitution of the United
States or any law of Congress, except for pensions, or upon any
regulation of an Executive Department, or upon any contract,
express or implied, with the Government of the United States,
or for damages, liquidated or unliquidated . . . in respect of
which claims the party would be entitled to redress against the
United States either in a court of law, equity, or admiralty if the
United States were suable ....
Currently, the Tucker Act does not contain the emphasized words. It
simply requires that a claimant must establish that the claim is based on
the Constitution, a law or regulation, an express or implied contract with
the Government, or liquidated or unliquidated damages not arising in
tort law.58 As noted by the Court of Claims in Pauley Petroleum Inc. v.
United States, 9 Congress deleted the language in 1948 merely because it
was deemed unnecessary with no intent to change the law substantively. 60
growing out of private claims consumes its time year after year in committee
work, rendered useless by the lack of time to consider and pass upon them.
Id.
55. Id.
By confining [jurisdiction] to claims under a law of the United States, regulations
of Departments, and to cases of contracts expressed and implied, there is still a
large class of cases in equity, in admiralty, and in tortious acts of the Government
through its agents, which are left to Congress, for which a court of justice is
better fitted to attain the right between the litigants.
Id. at 3-4.
56. 18 CONG. REC. 623 (1887).
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000).
59. 591 F.2d 1308 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
60. Id. at 1316 ("The particular language in the Tucker Act ... was omitted in the
1948 recodification, but the reviser's note clearly indicated that no substantive change was
intended."). See § 1491 historical and revision notes.
Words "in respect of which claims the party would be entitled to redress
against the United States either in a court of law, equity, or admiralty, if the
United States were suable" were omitted as unnecessary since the Court of
[Vol. 54:267
2004] Keys to the Courthouse Doors
Despite the omitted reference to claims in a court of equity, the Court of
Federal Claims has continued to utilize equitable theories to award
money damages in Tucker Act cases."
While basing monetary damages on equitable principles does not
defeat Tucker Act jurisdiction, claims seeking equitable remedies such as
specific performance fall outside the Court of Federal Claims'
jurisdiction.62 Thus, two distinct concepts exist: application of equitable
principles to support a monetary remedy (damages) and a purely
equitable remedy.63 The deletion of words referring to courts of equity
did not represent a legislative mandate that equitable claims against the
Government fell outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Claims
64
because the Court of Claims still could hear such claims if monetary
61damages were sought.
Notably, the last enumerated claim for which there is express
jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, liquidated and unliquidated damages
Claims manifestly, under this section will determine whether a petition against
the United States states a cause of action.
Id.; see also COWEN, supra note 47, at 43.
61. Williard L. Boyd III & Robert K. Huffman, The Treatment of Implied-in-Law and
Implied-in-Fact Contracts and Promissory Estoppel in the United States Claims Court, 40
CATH. U. L. REv. 605, 610 (1991) (citing Passaro v. United States, 774 F.2d 456 (Fed. Cir.
1985) and Pauley Petroleum). The Pauley court stated, "Equitable doctrines can be
employed incidentally to this court's general monetary jurisdiction either as equitable
procedures to arrive at a money judgment, or as substantive principles on which to base
the award of a money judgment." 591 F.2d at 1315 (citations omitted).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 131 U.S. 1, 17 (1889) (finding that the Tucker Act
permitted suits against the Government involving "claims for money only, or they may be
claims for property or specific relief, according as the context of the statute may require or
allow"). Jones involved a suit for specific performance seeking to force the United States
to deliver "patents for timber land." Id. at 1. The Supreme Court determined that such a
claim was outside Tucker Act jurisdiction. Id. at 19. The Court interpreted the Tucker
Act by comparing it with its predecessor statute, and found that the language was nearly
identical, except for an extension to claims for damages not sounding in tort for which
remedy may be obtained in a court of law, admiralty, or equity. Id. at 15-16. The Court
concluded that Congress could not have intended the additional language to expand the
jurisdiction to suits seeking specific performance, since such an expansion would provide
the judiciary the power to manage federal lands. Id. at 19.
63. In 1972, the Court of Claims clarified the distinction this way:
The correct premise is, not that we are without equity jurisdiction, but that we
cannot grant nonmonetary equitable relief such as an injunction, a declaratory
judgment, or specific performance. Where the relief is monetary, we can call
upon such equitable concepts as rescission and reformation to help us reach the
right result.
Quinault Allottee Ass'n v. United States, 453 F.2d 1272, 1274 n.1 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (citations
omitted). The court rejected the "ancient but inaccurate shibboleth" that it does not have
any equity jurisdiction. Id.
64. See § 1491 historical and revision notes.
65. See discussion supra note 63.
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not sounding in tort, has gone largely unnoticed by the courts. Courts
have deflated the text and have confined allowable claims only to those
based on the Constitution, a law or regulation, or an express or implied
contract with the Government.66
B. Blue Fox and Insurance Co. of the West -Courts Attack Sureties'
Standing Under the Tucker Act
1. Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc.-An Ominous Sign
In Blue Fox, the Supreme Court held that the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) 7 did not waive sovereign immunity to allow
subcontractors and suppliers to assert claims against contract funds held
by the United States.68 This is not a novel principle. 69  However, the
Court added that "other creditors" are also barred from making
equitable claims .7  This vague statement raises an important question:
did the Supreme Court hold that sureties have no standing to sue the
Government?
Blue Fox involved a contract between Verdan Technology (Verdan)
and the Department of Army (Army) to install a telephone switching
system. 71 Verdan employed Blue Fox, Inc. as a subcontractor.7 Verdanfailed to pay Blue Fox $46,586. 7' Despite Blue Fox's notification to the
66. See, e.g., Ins. Co. of the West v. United States, 243 F.3d 1367, 1372-74 (Fed. Cir.
2001). The Federal Circuit stated the principle that a waiver of sovereign immunity must
be "unequivocally expressed." Id. at 1372 (quoting United States v. Nordic Vill. Inc., 503
U.S. 30, 33 (1992)). However, it ignored that principle by observing, "ICW relies on only
one statutory basis for the waiver of sovereign immunity"-a claim founded on express
contract. Id. Nonetheless, ICW argued that its jurisdictional claim was based also on the
Tucker Act provision permitting claims for liquidated damages not sounding in tort. Brief
of Plaintiff-Appellee at 22-25, Ins. Co. of the West (No. 00-5039). ICW noted, "[This little
noted section of the Tucker Act has been recognized by the Supreme Court." Id. at 22. It
pointed to two cases where the Supreme Court found jurisdiction on the "damages not
sounding in tort" provision: United States v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., 298 U.S. 483
(1936), and United States v. Cornell Steamboat Co., 202 U.S. 184 (1905). Id. at 22-23.
Despite ICW's arguments, the Federal Circuit seemingly ignored this statutory basis.
67. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
68. Dep't of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 265 (1999). This case involved
the APA, rather than the Tucker Act. Nevertheless, as will be discussed, Blue Fox's
impact on surety claims via the Tucker Act is substantial.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 241 (1947) ("[Njothing
is more clear than that laborers and materialmen do not have enforceable rights against
the United States for their compensation.").
70. Blue Fox, 525 U.S at 264-65.
71. Id. at 257.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 258.
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Army that Verdan had failed to pay, the Army continued making
progress payments to Verdan. 4
Blue Fox sued the Army in federal district court for the balance due
and asserted an equitable lien on the funds based on jurisdiction
provided by § 702 of the APA." The district court granted the Army's
motion for summary judgment, holding that the sovereign immunity
waiver in the APA was not applicable to Blue Fox's claim because the
claim involved money damages, which are outside the scope of the § 702
76
waiver.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Blue
Fox could assert an equitable lien under the APA because it was an
equitable claim for "specific performance for the payment of money...
[and] not an action for money damages., 77 In supporting its holding that
subcontractors have equitable rights against the Government, the court
noted that a line of Supreme Court cases have upheld a surety's
equitable rights of subrogation by recognizing the equitable rights of the
subcontractor.7 These cases are discussed later as cornerstone suretyship
79
cases.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision and held that
liens, although equitable in nature, are still claims for compensatory
relief. o Therefore, the claim was beyond the scope of the § 702 waiver."
The Court also responded to Blue Fox's assertion that based on the
Court's recognition of the surety's equitable claims, it was implicitly
74. Id.
75. Id.; see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000) ("An action in a
court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages ... shall not be
dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States...
."). Blue Fox's alternatives in seeking repayment were fairly limited. Blue Fox could not
make a claim under a payment bond since Verdan did not post any bonds. Blue Fox, 525
U.S. at 258. Blue Fox sought jurisdiction under the APA because it believed the Tucker
Act did not permit suits in which equitable rights were asserted. Respondent's Brief, Blue
Fox (No. 98-1642), 1998 WL 713458, at *9.
76. Blue Fox, Inc. v. United States Small Bus. Admin., No. CIV. 95-612-FR, 1996 WL
293363, at *5 (D. Or. May 24, 1996), rev'd in part and affd in part and remanded 121 F.3d
1357 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Dep't of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc.,
525 U.S. 255 (1999).
77. Blue Fox Inc. v. Small Bus. Admin., 121 F.3d 1357, 1359 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd and
remanded sub nom. Dep't of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255 (1999).
78. See id. at 1361-62.
79. Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132 (1962); Henningsen v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co., 208 U.S. 404 (1908); Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227
(1896).
80. Blue Fox, 525 U.S. at 265.
81. Id. at 262.
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recognizing subcontractor's equitable rights . The Court stated that the
line of cases involving the surety's claim of equitable subrogation did not
address the issue of sovereign immunity and stated that sovereign
immunity prevents claims brought by subcontractors and "other
creditors.'83
2. Insurance Co. of the West v. United States - A Direct Blow
The surety's ability to make claims for contract balances was at issue
for the first time since Blue Fox in Insurance Co. of the West v. United
States.84  In that case, Insurance Company of the West (ICW), the
performance bond surety, remedied the performance default.85 The
surety then sued the United States, the obligee on the bond, under the
Tucker Act to recover funds that the Government paid the contractor
directly after agreeing to send future payments to ICW.16 The Federal
Circuit held for ICW.
87
82. See Brief for the Respondent, Blue Fox, 525 U.S. 255 (1999) (No. 98-1642), 1998
WL 713458, at *10 ("This suit seeks to declare and enforce equitable rights. The rights of
unpaid laborers and materialmen to payment from unexpended contract balances are
long-recognized in this Court's decisions.").
83. Blue Fox, 525 U.S. at 265. Thomas Spaulding, Blue Fox's attorney, reported that
the Supreme Court dismissed the argument as not supported by Supreme Court
precedent. Spaulding, supra note 28, at 142.
Where in the Supreme Court's decisions, Rehnquist demanded to know, did I
find authority for a subcontractor to assert such a lien? Although a line of
Supreme Court suretyship cases stretching back 100 years had expressly
recognized such rights, Rehnquist was unconvinced that a lien could arise against
the government as a stakeholder of funds: "With a body that has sovereign
immunity, you just don't lightly say they were a stakeholder unless there is some
authority," he proclaimed. The Chief, I also learned, was only interested in
Supreme Court authority. When I uttered in passing the name of a lower federal
court, Rehnquist cut me off in mid-sentence: "We're not bound by Court of
Claims cases here."
Id.
84. 243 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
85. Id. at 1369.
86. See id. If ICW had not remedied the default, it could have attempted to assert an
overpayment defense. Contractors are typically paid progress payments. Robert B. Flaig
et al., Suing the Private Owner, in CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION: REPRESENTING THE
CONTRACTOR § 5.9 (John D. Carter et al. eds., 2d ed. 1992). That is, contractors are paid
in relation to the work completed. As guarantor of the contractor's performance and
obligations, the surety has a strong interest that the obligee (the project owner) will not
pay the contractor in advance of performance. James A. Knox, Jr., Quid Without Quo:
The Surety's Overpayment Defense, 13 CONSTRUCTtON LAW 3 (1994), WESTLAW, 13-
OCT CONSLAW 3, at *3. Otherwise, if payments get too far ahead of the contractor's
progress, the project owner loses the financial carrot over the contractor to complete the
project, and the surety loses necessary contract funds to complete the project. Id. at *4.
The law generally protects the surety against the obligee's overpayment by discharging the
surety from its obligations. Id. at *3. "Depending on the jurisdiction ... that discharge
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The Government, in Insurance Co. of the West, argued that Blue Fox
barred a surety's right to sue the Government for contract funds.8 In this
case, the Air Force awarded a construction contract to P.C.E. Limited
(PCE). 9 PCE subsequently advised the project owner that it would be
unable to complete the contract, and that its surety, ICW, would
undertake completion. 90 PCE directed that the Air Force pay all
remaining funds directly to ICW.9 ' The Air Force issued a contract
92
modification changing the remittance address to ICW's address.
Despite this modification, the Air Force continued to remit payments to
PCE.93 Asserting jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, ICW filed suit in the
Court of Federal Claims to recoup $174,000 in funds that the Air Force
improperly paid to PCE.94 The Court of Claims certified to the Federal
Circuit the question of whether a surety had standing to sue under the
Tucker Act in light of Blue Fox.9" The Federal Circuit held that, in light
of Blue Fox, courts may not rely on Prairie State Bank, Henningsen, or
Pearlman to support a waiver of sovereign immunity in cases involving
will be either total or to the extent of any prejudice." Id. The overpayment defense arises
from the obligee's duty of good faith and a duty to inform the surety of a material increase
in risk. Id. This duty is breached when "(1) the obligee knows or should know of a
material increase in the surety's risk; (2) the surety does not know of the increased risk;
and (3) the obligee has a reasonable opportunity to inform the surety but fails to do so."
Id. This general obligation of care in making progress payments to the contractor exists
with respect to construction contracts involving the Federal Government. If the
government acted arbitrarily and capriciously, a pro tanto discharge may result. M.
Michael Egan & Marla Eastwood, Discharge of the Performance Bond Surety, in THE
LAW OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 5, at 119, 125. In Balboa, the surety sued the United
States to recover improperly paid progress payments that the Government paid to the
contractor after the surety notified it of the contractor's default. 775 F.2d 1158, 1159-60
(Fed. Cir. 1985). The Federal Circuit held that the Government must exercise "reasonable
discretion" in making payments to the contractor after it has notice that the contractor is
having difficulties. Id. at 1164. Generally, the overpayment defense is not available to the
surety against claims submitted under the payment bond. Knox, supra.
87. The court reconciled its holding with Blue Fox by asserting that Blue Fox was
merely restating well-settled law that a subcontractor may not sue the Government. Ins.
Co. of the West, 243 F.3d at 1371. However, the court stated that because Insurance
Company of the West, as performance bond surety, was subrogated to the rights of
contractor (and not the subcontractor), it may bring suit against the United States. Id.
88. Id. at 1370; see also Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 6, Ins. Co. of the West (No.
00-5039).
89. Ins. Co. of the West, 243 F.3d at 1369.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. Modifications of government contracts are issued pursuant to part 43 of the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). 48 C.F.R. pt. 43 (2003).
93. Ins. Co. of the West, 243 F.3d at 1369.
94. Id.
95. See Ins. Co. of the West v. United States, No. 99-124C, 1999 WL 33604131, at *2
(Fed. Cl. Dec. 10, 1999), affd and remanded 243 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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surety claims against the Government. 96 Therefore, sureties must assert
Tucker Act jurisdiction based on the text of the Tucker Act.97 The court
noted that ICW established jurisdiction based on the provision in the
Tucker Act that waived immunity for a claim against the United States
founded on contract with the United States.9 The court found that, as a
performance bond surety, 1CW was subrogated to the rights of the
contractor, which possessed the original claim based on its contract with
the Government.99 Therefore, the court held that ICW could bring suit
against the United States.'00 However, in dictum damaging to payment
bond sureties, the Federal Circuit stated that a payment bond surety "is
subrogated only to the rights of the subcontractor" and "has no
enforceable rights against the government." '1'
The case was remanded to the Court of Federal Claims for trial on the
merits.' °2  The trial court held that a surety that discharges the
performance of the contractor (a performance bond surety) is subrogated
to the rights of the defaulted contractor.' 3 Therefore, 1CW could claim
that the Air Force improperly paid the funds.' 4 The court withheld final
judgment, however, pending a determination of the reasonableness of
the payments made by the government.'5  The trial court also
commented on the Federal Circuit's dicta concerning a payment bond
surety's subrogation rights, stating, "[T]his court respectfully must
conclude that the dicta in West 1- stating that a surety steps in the shoes
of a subcontractor, and not the contractor for which it issued bonds-are
not supported by precedent.""'" This statement is only mild consolation
to payment bond sureties, because it is dictum by a lower court regarding
dictum by a higher court in a case involving a performance bond surety,
not a payment bond surety. Therefore, the status of the payment bond
surety as a valid claimant remains in doubt.0 7
96. Ins. Co. of the West, 243 F.3d at 1372.
97. See id.
98. Id.; 28 U.S.C § 1491(a)(1) (2000).
99. Ins. Co. of the West, 243 F.3d at 1375.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1371 ("It is well-established that a surety who discharges a contractor's
obligation to pay subcontractors is subrogated only to the rights of the subcontractor.
Such a surety does not step into the shoes of the contractor and has no enforceable rights
against the government.").
102. Id. at 1375.
103. Ins. Co. of the West v. United States, 55 Fed. CI. 529, 544 (Fed. CI. 2003).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 535.
107. See supra text accompanying note 101.
[Vol. 54:267
Keys to the Courthouse Doors
C. The Cornerstone Suretyship Cases
Analysis of Blue Fox and Insurance Co. of the West requires an
understanding of the precedent discussed in these cases. As noted, Blue
Fox advanced this precedent in its brief, attempting to establish the
subcontractor's equitable rights.'08 The Supreme Court dismissed these
cases as not pertinent to the sovereign immunity issue.1"9 In Insurance
Co. of the West, the Government characterized the Supreme Court's
dicta as overruling precedent sub silentio," ° precluding any sovereign
immunity waiver based on these cases."
1. Prairie State Bank v. United States
Prairie State Bank involved a dispute over funds held by the
Government relating to a construction contract in which the contractor,
Charles Sundberg & Co. (Sundberg), agreed to construct a customhouse
in Galveston, Texas. ' 12 The dispute was between Prairie State Bank,
which made a loan to Sundberg secured by the final payment under the
construction contract," 3 and Charles Hitchcock, the surety, who
completed the construction contract after Sundberg defaulted.' 4 The
lower court decided that the final payment should be paid to
Hitchcock."5 The Supreme Court affirmed that the surety's subrogation
claim in equity was superior to the bank's claim." 6  The Court
characterized the principle that a surety is entitled to assert its equitable
subrogation claims as "elementary" 7 and deeply rooted in the common
law."" The Court noted that the surety was subrogated not only to the
108, See Brief for the Respondent, Dep't of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255
(1999) (No. 97-1642), 1998 WL 713458, at *10-11.
109. Blue Fox, 525 U.S. at 265.
110. Precedent that is overruled sub silentio is overruled by the court without any
express acknowledgement or notice that it is doing so. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1442 (7th ed. 1999).
111. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 13-14, Ins. Co. of the West v. United States, 243
F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (No. 00-5039) ("Jurisdiction to entertain equitable subrogation
claims has been based solely on judicial precedent. The Supreme Court recently made
clear that this prior judicial precedent does not support a waiver of sovereign immunity...
112. Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227, 228 (1896).
113. Id. at 228-29.
114. Id. at 229.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 240.
117. Id. at 231.
118. See id.
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rights of Sundberg, but also to the right of the United States to use the
contract funds that it held to complete the work itself." 9
The holding in Prairie State Bank is significant for two reasons. First, it
serves as the legal foundation to support the validity of sureties'
equitable subrogation claims. Second, the Court established that a
surety that remedies a default in performance is subrogated to the rights
of the contractor (the bond principal) and the Government (the
obligee)."'
2. Henningsen v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
Henningsen also involved a dispute over contract funds between a
surety and a bank. Specifically, Henningsen entered into a contract with
the United States to construct certain buildings at a military
installation. 112  Pursuant to statute, Henningsen provided a bond
underwritten by the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (USF&G)
to secure its performance and payment to subcontractors.
123
Subsequently, Henningsen obtained a loan from the National Commerce
Bank of Seattle and secured it with an assignment of contract funds.
2 4
Because Henningsen failed to pay certain subcontractor claims, USF&G
paid the claims.125  To recoup its losses and collect contract funds,
USF&G filed suit to enjoin the bank from collecting any contract
balances. 126
In Henningsen, the Court expanded the principles enunciated in
Prairie State Bank regarding a surety that remedies a performance
default, and held that a surety that remedies a payment default (pays
subcontractors and suppliers) is entitled to subrogation rights. 127  The
Court also stated that the surety is subrogated to the rights of the
contractor and the Government, which is "released ... from all equitable
obligations to see that the laborers . . . were paid.' ' 28  The Court
119. Id. at 232-33.
120. See Bachrach & Burch, supra note 20, at 421.
121. Prairie State Bank, 164 U.S. at 232-33.
122. Henningsen v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 208 U.S. 404, 404 (1908).
123. Id. at 406.
124. Id. at 405.
125. Id. at 404-05.
126. Id. at 405.
127. See id. at 410.
128. Henningsen, 208 U.S. at 410. This statement flatly contradicts the position held
by the Federal Circuit in Insurance Co. of the West, which is that a payment bond surety is
subrogated solely to the rights of the subcontractor. Ins. Co. of the West v. United States,
243 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In his 1979 article, Daniel Mungall exposes the error
in such a position. Mungall, supra note 19, at 608 ("Such analysis fails to recognize the
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ultimately found that the surety's subrogation claims were superior to the
bank's claim, and therefore, the surety was entitled to the funds.
2 9
3. Pearlman v. Reliance Insurance Co.
Pearlman involved a dispute between the surety and bankruptcy
trustee of Dutcher Construction Corp. (Dutcher).3 ' Dutcher entered
into a contract with the United States to work on the St. Lawrence
Seaway project. 3' It posted performance and payment bonds
underwritten by Reliance Insurance Co. (Reliance).132  Dutcher
experienced financial difficulties and was unable to pay certain
subcontractors and suppliers.'33  The surety, Reliance, fulfilled its
obligations and paid approximately $350,000 to subcontractors. 34 The
Government turned over the contract balance of $87,000 to Pearlman as
bankruptcy trustee.' 35  Reliance then sued Pearlman, claiming
136
entitlement to the funds. The Court based its decision on Prairie State
Bank and Henningsen, which affirmed the surety's right to subrogation
whether the surety is a performance bond surety or a payment bond
surety.17
true nature of the obligation which the surety discharges."). Mungall explains that the
surety is also subrogated to the rights of the project owner:
When an owner requires a payment bond, it thereby obtains from the
contractor an undertaking to pay the suppliers. The suppliers are third party
beneficiaries of the payment bond undertaking; but the undertaking is
nonetheless by the contractor as promisor to the owner as promisee....
When the promisor of a third party beneficiary undertaking fails to perform,
the third party beneficiaries have a right to enforce the promise; but so also does
the promisee!
id. In addition, Henningsen recognizes the Government's equitable obligations to
subcontractors, despite a lack of privity.
129. Henningsen, 208 U.S. at 411.
130. Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co.. 371 U.S. 132, 133 (1962).
131. Id.
132. Id.




137. Id. at 139 ("These two cases .. establish the surety's right to subrogation in such
a fund [the contract balances] whether its bond be for performance or payment.").
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II. CLAIMS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT POST BLUE Fox-A
SOLUTION
A. A Critique of Blue Fox and Insurance Co. of the West
Blue Fox and Insurance Co. of the West have weakened the
foundations supporting the payment bond surety's ability to sue the
Government. Therefore, a closer examination of these cases is in order.
The principles and concepts left untouched by these cases are as
significant as their central holdings.
1. Blue Fox
For a case that had such significant implications regarding the surety's
ability to sue the government under the Tucker Act, 138 Blue Fox did not
involve a surety, 39 nor did it involve the Tucker Act."0 Blue Fox asserted
a claim against the Government through the APA."'1
The surety-related implications were introduced to the case through an
argument by the subcontractor (Blue Fox), asserting that it had equitable
rights that were enforceable through the APA. 1 2 To explain the nature
of a subcontractor's equitable rights, Blue Fox discussed the cornerstone
surety decisions that upheld "the equitable subrogation rights of sureties
under federal contracts., 143  Blue Fox explained that the sureties'
equitable rights relied on the equitable rights of subcontractors.
Therefore, the cornerstone surety cases reflect a judicial recognition of a
subcontractor's equitable rights. Blue Fox believed that it had a remedy
(suit through the APA), and sought to establish that it had an
enforceable right through precedent regarding a surety's equitable right
of subrogation.14
138. The surety industry was quite interested in the case, its outcome, and its potential
effects. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae The Surety Association of America in Support of
Neither Party at 1-2, Dep't of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255 (1999) (No. 97-
1642) (stating "[s]ureties, therefore, have a keen interest in the portions of this case which
involve the existence and extent of Blue Fox's equitable lien"); Gallagher, Payment
Bonds, supra note 17, at 227 (describing the Ninth Circuit's decision); Klinger, supra note
40, at 23 ("The purpose of this article is to analyze the Court's opinion in Blue Fox... and
explore the potential for far-reaching effects of the Court's decision.').
139. Blue Fox, 525 U.S. at 256-57.
140. Id. at 258.
141. Id.
142. Brief of Respondent, Blue Fox (No. 97-1642), 1998 WL 713458, at *10.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at *6. Blue Fox asserted a rather novel argument that it was not claiming
money damages, which are outside the scope of the APA, but equitable relief through the
enforcement of a lien. id.
[Vol. 54:267
Keys to the Courthouse Doors
The Supreme Court's curious response to this argument was needlessly
damaging to sureties. It could have acknowledged that subcontractors do
indeed have equitable rights, but unlike a surety's rights, they are not
146
enforceable, reaching the same result in the instant case. 46 Such a
position would be reasonable and consistent with precedent. 147
Unfortunately, the Court mischaracterized Blue Fox's reason for
discussing the surety precedent. The Court stated that Blue Fox
presented the surety precedent to suggest that subcontractors can sue the
Government.48 However, Blue Fox's aims in presenting these cases were
less ambitious: they were not asserting the surety precedent as proof
positive that subcontractor can sue the Government. Rather, Blue Fox
discussed the cases only to establish its right to recover against the
Government.' 9 Its assertion that it could enforce this right through suit
against the Government is not in the discussion regarding the surety
cases, but elsewhere in the argument.'50
Because of the mischaracterization, the Court, in essence, responded
to an unasked question. Blue Fox was not advancing Prairie State Bank,
Henningsen and Pearlman as direct support of a waiver of sovereign
immunity. However, the Court, responding to the cases as if it were,
stating:
None of the cases relied upon by respondent involved a
question of sovereign immunity, and, in fact, none involved a
subcontractor directly asserting a claim against the
Respondent is not asking for the government to pick up the tab whenever the
prime contractor was supposed to pay, but did not. That would be damages.
Rather, Respondent seeks to be paid from remaining funds, if any. If no funds
remain, then there is nothing to lien. In this regard, Respondent seeks nothing
more than the ability-which sureties have had for decades-to enforce payment
from remaining contract monies.
Id. at *7.
146. A long line of cases have held that subcontractors may not sue the Government.
See, e.g., United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 241 (1947).
147. See, e.g., Henningsen v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 208 U.S. 404, 410 (1908)
(recognizing the Government's obligations to see to it that subcontractors are paid). In
Balboa Insurance Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1985), the Federal Circuit
synthesized Supreme Court precedent which held that subcontractors may not sue the
Government and precedent which upheld surety claims against the Government and
concluded, "Decisions of our predecessor court and the Supreme Court make clear that a
surety is not in the same position as that of a contractor or materialman." Id. at 1160.
148. Blue Fox, 525 U.S. at 264.
149. Brief of Respondent, Blue Fox (No. 97-1642), 1998 WL 713458, at *10 ("The
rights of unpaid laborers and materialman to payment from unexpended contract balances
are long-recognized in this Court's dccisions. To understand the nature of these rights ...
it is useful to first consider this Court's decisions upholding the equitable subrogation
rights of sureties under federal contracts.").
150. Id. at *12-13.
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Government. Instead, these cases dealt with disputes between
private parties over priority to funds which had been
transferred out of the Treasury and as to which the Government
had disclaimed any ownership."'
Although the cases did not explicitly involve a waiver of sovereign
immunity, one of the cases, Prairie State Bank, contrary to the Supreme
Court's assertion, did indeed involve funds held by the Government.
152
In Henningsen and Pearlman, the Government paid the funds to a party
other than the surety.53  Thus, these cases questioned whether the
Government paid the funds to the correct party.5 4 The Government,
especially in Prairie State Bank, played a part in the dispute.'5  Despite
151. Blue Fox, 525 U.S. at 265.
152. As amicus curiae in Insurance Co. of the West, The Surety Association of
America points out that the trial court involved in the Prairie State Bank case noted that
the funds in dispute were held by the Government. Brief of Amicus Curiae The Surety
Association of America Urging Affirmance of the Order of the Court of Federal Claims at
20, Ins. Co. of the West v. United States, 243 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (No. 00-5039); see
also Hitchcock v. United States, 27 Ct. Cl. 185 (Ct. Cl. 1892). The facts in Hitchcock
indicate that the final payment that the surety sought to recover was held by the U.S.
Treasury at the time of the dispute. The statement of the facts in the reported opinion
stated:
The price of the work has been paid except the retained 10 per cent on the
whole contract price ... all of which is claimed by said Hitchcock [(the surety)],
part of which is adversely claimed by said bank, and none of which is claimed at
the Treasury Department by said Charles Sundberg & Co. [(the defaulted
contractor)]. The defendants [(the United States)] recognize the rights of one of
the petitioners herein to favorable findings and conclusions, and are ready and
willing to pay the same to whomsoever is found by the court to be entitled
thereto.
Id. at 198. Therefore, contrary to the Supreme Court's reading of the facts, the
Government was holding the funds in dispute and the surety had sued the United States
for recovery.
153. See Henningsen v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co,, 208 U.S. 404, 405 (1908).
This suit was commenced by the Guaranty Company by a bill in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the District of Washington to restrain the
appellants from collecting or accepting the balance due on the contract from the
United States. It appeared at the time of the commencement of the suit that
there was in the hands of the quartermaster, due upon the contract, the sum of
$13,066, which he was about to pay to Spencer [(trustee of the bank)] .... On
June 17, 1904, an arrangement was made between the parties, by which the sum
of $8,024.21 was paid to certain creditors, and the balance . . . was applied in
conditional payment of the indebtedness of the contractors to the bank, with a
stipulation that if it should be finally determined that the Guaranty Company
was entitled to receive it then the bank should pay it to the Guaranty Company.
Id.; see also Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 134 (1962) (noting that after the
surety discharged the bond principal's obligation, the Government turned over the
contract balance to the bankruptcy trustee).
154. Pearlman, 371 U.S. at 134; Henningsen, 208 U.S. at 405.
155. See discussion supra note 152.
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the misreading of precedent and the mischaracterization of Blue Fox's
argument, the Court's decision is a signal to sureties that they cannot rely
on Prairie State Bank, Henningsen, and Pearlman in seeking a waiver of
sovereign immunity. 
1 6
Nevertheless, the Court's decision yields a few positive observations
concerning a payment bond surety's ability to sue the Government.
First, the Court did not dispute that Prairie State Bank, Henningsen, and
Pearlman firmly established the surety's equitable subrogation rights
157
and the existence of the Government's equitable obligations to ensure
payment of subcontractors. 158  Thus, these principles remain in place.
Second, the Court maintained the distinction between equitable
remedies, which fall outside of the Court of Claims' Tucker Act
jurisdiction, and the use of equitable principles to enforce the award of
monetary damages, which are within Tucker Act jurisdiction.159 Blue Fox
asserted that the remedy it sought was equitable and, therefore,
jurisdiction could be founded upon the APA.'60 However, the Court
rejected this argument and held that although the lien sought by Blue
Fox was equitable in nature, the remedy requested was "money
damages.. 6. Similarly, a payment bond surety could argue that although
its theory is equitable, it is seeking damages, which are within the scope
of the Tucker Act, to recoup its losses. Finally, the Supreme Court did
not hold that sureties could not sue the Government. Rather, the
Court's dicta concerning the surety precedent only indicated that sureties
must look elsewhere to find Tucker Act jurisdiction.162
2. Insurance Co. of the West
In Insurance Co. of the West, the Government used the Supreme
Court's statement regarding surety precedent to attack the surety's claim
of a sovereign immunity waiver under the Tucker Act. 16 1 The
156. Blue Fox, 525 U.S. at 265.
157. See Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227, 231 (1896).
158. See Henningsen, 208 U.S. at 410.
159. Blue Fox, 525 U.S. at 260-61.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 262 ("[T]he equitable nature of the lien sought by respondent here does not
mean that its ultimate claim was not one for 'money damages'....").
162. There is the possibility that the Court knew where it was heading. Perhaps the
comments regarding the surety precedent were intentional to lead to the conclusion that
"sovereign immunity bars . . . other creditors" from making claims against the
Government. Id. at 265. Perhaps the Supreme Court is of the opinion that sureties may
not sue the Government. However, since Blue Fox, the question has not been addressed
by the Supreme Court.
163. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 6, Ins. Co. of the West v. United States, 243 F.3d
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (No. 00-5039).
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Government argued, "The Supreme Court recently made clear in
Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., that its prior precedent does
not support a waiver of sovereign immunity for equitable subrogation
claims. Accordingly, the precedent of this Court and the Court of
Federal Claims is unfounded and no longer valid." 164 The Government
argued that sureties typically have relied upon "a core of three Supreme
Court cases" to establish a sovereign immunity waiver but will no longer
be able to do so in light of Blue Fox. 5' The court agreed with this
argument but found jurisdiction through the text of the Tucker Act.'66
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit's decision is flawed in three respects.
First, the decision rests on the effect of the Supreme Court's statement
167regarding the surety precedent . As noted previously, the Supreme
Court's reading of the surety precedent is incorrect.16s In Prairie State
Bank, the Government held the funds that the surety was seeking to169
recover. Although a sovereign immunity waiver was not explicitly
addressed in this case, it was implied because the Government was a key
player by holding the funds in the dispute, and the Court enforced the
sureties' equitable subrogation rights. 70
The second flaw in the Federal Circuit's decision is the court's
misunderstanding of subrogation. When a surety discharges a principal's
obligation, it is subrogated to the rights of the obligee that benefited
164. Id. (citations omitted). In the United States Attorneys' Manual, the Department
of Justice emphasizes that any sovereign immunity waiver must be construed narrowly.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RESOURCE MANUAL § 31 (1998), http://www.usdoj.gov/
usao/eousa/foia reading-room/usam/title4/civOO03l.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
The terms of a statute waiving immunity from suit define the court's
jurisdiction to entertain suit, and the consent is no broader than the limitations
which condition it. Inasmuch as the United States may not be sued in the
absence of consent legislation, the claimant's right to sue is necessarily subject to
such conditions as Congress has seen fit to impose, including restrictions as to
time, place, and manner of suit. No representative of the United States has the
power to waive jurisdictional conditions or limitations.
Jurisdiction cannot be extended by implication beyond the plain language of
the statute.
Id. (citations omitted)
165. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 14-1 g, Ins. Co. of the West (No. 00-5039).
166. See infra Part I.B.2.
167. Ins. Co. of the West, 243 F.3d at 1372 ("[W]e agree with the government that,
after Blue Fox, we can no longer rely on those three cases to find a waiver of sovereign
immunity.... This court is obligated to follow the Supreme Court's interpretation in Blue
Fox of those three cases, even though that interpretation may be dicta." (citation
omitted)).
16& See supra Part II.A.1.
169. See discussion supra note 152.
170. See discussion supra note 152.
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from the discharge."' Thus, whether a contractor defaults under a
performance bond or a payment bond, the surety, by completing the
project or by paying subcontractors, is subrogated to the rights of the
obligee. The Federal Circuit held that a performance bond surety is
subrogated only to the rights of the contractor17 3 and a payment bond
surety is subrogated only to the rights of the subcontractor. 74 However,
the Federal Circuit's dicta regarding a payment bond surety's
subrogation rights is not only contrary to surety principles, but also it
clearly contradicts precedent holding that the surety is subrogated to the
rights of the subcontractor, contractor and obligee.
The third flaw is the court's reading of the Tucker Act. The court held
that because of Blue Fox, a surety cannot use the surety cornerstone
cases and their progeny, but must find a statutory basis to establish the
existence of a waiver of sovereign immunity. 176  The court found this
statutory basis under the Tucker Act provision permitting suits "founded
... upon any express or implied contract with the United States.', 7 7 The
court held that as subrogee to the contractor, which is a party to a
contract with the United States, the performance bond surety may find
Tucker Act jurisdiction based on a claim founded on contract.'
However, in its dicta concerning a payment bond surety, the court did
not follow its own advice that "it is possible to find support for a waiver
of sovereign immunity not only in statutory language but also in statutory
purposes and history.'
' 79
B. History of the Tucker Act
The general purpose of the Tucker Act, as envisioned by the drafters,
was to relieve Congress from many of the claims it was required to
consider as private bills, and to transfer those claims to the Court of
171. Mungall, supra note 19, at 607 ("[Upon subrogation], the surety is substituted for
the owner with respect to the rights which the owner has against the contractor as a result
of the latter's failure to perform.").
172. Id.
173. Ins. Co. of the West v. United States, 243 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
("[A]fter stepping into the shoes of a contractor, [the surety] may rely on the waiver of
sovereign immunity in the Tucker Act .... ").
174. Id. at 1371 ("[The payment bond surety] is subrogated only to the rights of the
subcontractor. Such a surety does not step into the shoes of the contractor and has no
enforceable rights against the government.").
175. See infra Part I.B.2. In fact, the case upon which Insurance Co. of the West
primarily relies is Pearlman, a payment bond case.
176. Ins. Co. of the West, 243 F.3d at 1372.
177. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000).
178. Ins. Co. of the West, 243 F.3d at 1375.
179. Id. at 1372.
2004]
Catholic University Law Review
Claims.18  In order to achieve its objective, Congress intended to
establish a substantially broad jurisdiction for the court."" The
practically all-encompassing nature of the legislation is demonstrated by
the House discussion. Consider the interchange between
Representatives Reed and Tucker during a debate on January 13, 1887:
Mr. Reed: Is the bill sufficiently broad to cover all claims
against the United States? Does it give the right to sue the
United States in all cases?
Mr. Tucker: Not in all cases.
Mr. Reed: I mean in all cases where there is a claim of right in
law or equity, technically so called.
Mr. Tucker: Yes; equity and admiralty. The only cases not
provided for are suits upon the use of a patent right by the
Government and suits in reference to captured and abandoned
property which are now barred by the statutes of limitations.V
Immediately prior to the vote, Representative Bayne commented that
the legislation would "give the people of the United States what every
civilized nation of the world has already done-the right to go into the
courts and seek redress against the Government for their grievances....
Congress's clear intent was to establish broad jurisdiction for the Court
of Claims. To interpret the intent otherwise would directly conflict with
its stated objective: relieving Congress's burden in regard to private bills.
Construing the Tucker Act as constraining the types of claims to textual
limitations (claims founded upon the Constitution, act of Congress,
180. H. R. REP. No. 49-1077, at 4 (1886). Prior to the passage of the Tucker Act,
seeking relief from Congress was a citizen's only remedy for a claim against the United
States. Over fifty years before the Tucker Act's enactment, a Senate report contained the
following observation regarding a claim for relief brought by a surety:
As between citizen and citizen, a court of equity would relieve against a mistake
under similar circumstances, so the Congress of the United States, in the exercise
of the equitable powers which they have reserved to themselves, ought to relieve
the sureties . . . against all the moneys expressed in the two bonds . . . with
interest thereon, as expressed in the bill.
The United States have not permitted the courts of justice to sustain bills in
equity against the United States as defendants ... nor have the courts of justice
used or claimed to hold cognizance of such bills in equity without the special
authority of an act of Congress.
S. REP. NO. 23-38, 1st Sess., at 3 (1834).
181. 18 CONG. REC. 622 (1887)
182. Id. (emphasis added). Upon presentation of the conference report regarding the
legislation, Representative Tucker stressed the broad nature of the intended jurisdiction.
Id. at 2678 ("[T]he purpose was to extend it to all claims in law, or equity, or admiralty...
. .
183. Id. at 2680.
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regulation, or express or implied contract) is contrary to the drafter'sintent."'
Private bills were founded on equitable principles."5 Therefore, in
addition to the intended broad scope of jurisdiction, the fact that the
Court of Claims's jurisdiction was meant to replace Congress's
consideration of private bills indicates that the drafters intended the
court to consider matters of equity. Equitable remedies are provided on
what is just and right, rather than on a strict legal basis.' s Therefore, as
the replacement of Congress's consideration of private bills, the Court of
Claims has the statutory and contextual basis under the Tucker Act to
act out of equity in a suit for money. In addition, by using the history of
private bills as an indicator of the Court of Claims's intended jurisdiction,
184. As noted previously, the 1948 deletion of the language referencing claims to
which a person would be entitled in courts of law or equity was not a substantive reduction
in scope, but rather an elimination of surplusage. See supra note 60.
185. See United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 440 (1896) (presenting an equitable
basis for private bills).
The nation, speaking broadly, owes a "debt" to an individual when his claim
grows out of general principles of right and justice; when, in other words, it is
based upon considerations of a moral or merely honorary nature, such as are
binding on the conscience or the honor of an individual, although the debt could
obtain no recognition in a court of law.
Id.; see also Private Bills in Congress, supra note 46, at 1703 ("The procedures and
standards developed by Congress in handling private bills are intended to yield a
roughhewn system of equity, so as to provide evenhanded treatment of individual claims
that may merit the exercise of the sovereign's conscience.").
186. For an illustration of Congress acting out of equity and fairness, see, for example,
H.R. REP. No. 35-197 (1858). In this House report, the House Committee of Claims
considered the referral of Senate Bill 68 to provide relief to an individual named Elias
Hall. Id. at 1. According to the report, Mr. Hall had provided weapons repair services to
the Army. Id. at 2. The commanding officer, General Dearborn, had proposed to pay Mr.
Hall "$50 per month and rations." Id. Mr. Hall was paid for a period of time, but
subsequently was not paid when General Dearborn left command and there was no
official record of the arrangement. Id. Mr. Hall submitted the claim to the Army. Id.
Because of the lack of any formal contract with Mr. Hall, the Army believed that it was
not authorized to pay the claim. Id. Mr. Hall submitted the claim to Congress, and upon
consideration Congress concluded that Hall should be paid. Id. at 3. The House report
quoted the findings contained in the Committee on Claims of the Senate:
The committee, therefore, concur with the head of the Ordnance Department,
after a full examination of the facts, that this venerable patriot has a just and
equitable claim upon the government; and as he has already completed his
seventy-sixth year, if his last days are to be cheered by a manifestation of justice
and magnanimity of his country, immediate action is indispensable.
Id. at 3 (emphasis added). Note, however, that Congress's jurisdiction for moral claims
generally has been broader and more flexible than any jurisdiction for moral claims held
by the courts. DAVID SCHWARTZ & SIDNEY B. JACOBY, LITIGATION WITH THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT § 6.119.2(b) (1970).
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it is significant that on several occasions Congress has granted relief to
sureties by discharging or reducing sureties' liability.1
87
CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of Blue Fox, the payment bond surety can present a
two-pronged argument in asserting that it may sue the Government
under the Tucker Act. First, it can argue that Blue Fox and Insurance
Co. of the West failed to understand or simply ignored precedent that
supported a payment bond surety's ability to sue the Government.1
8
With respect to Blue Fox, the Supreme Court held that the precedent of
Prairie State Bank, Henningsen, and Pearlman did not address the issue
of a waiver of sovereign immunity, but rather dealt with a dispute
between two private parties.18 9 The facts of the cases, specifically those of
Prairie State Bank, belie this sweeping conclusion. The facts of Prairie
State Bank indicate that the disputed funds were in the hands of the
Government during the dispute.1'9 Therefore, the fact that the Supreme
Court permitted suit where the Government held the funds implies that
the Court granted a waiver of sovereign immunity.9 With respect to
Insurance Co. of the West, the Federal Circuit's dicta regarding the
payment bond surety's subrogation rights contradict precedent and
commonly understood surety principles which clearly establish that a
payment bond surety is subrogated to the right of the obligee.'
92
The second prong of the payment bond surety's argument is necessary
in light of the possibility that the Supreme Court in Blue Fox
intentionally read the surety precedent in such a way as to lead to a
conclusion that sureties may not sue the Government. Therefore,
assuming that the precedent of Prairie State Bank, Henningsen, and
Pearlman no longer effectively grant admission to the courts, a new tact
is needed. Sureties can look to the drafting history of the Tucker Act,
which indicates a strong intent to grant Court of Claims jurisdiction for
claims for money damages founded on equitable principles.
3
187. See, e.g., S. REP No. 23-38, 1st Sess., at 1-3 (1834) (reliving sureties of a tax
collector of liability which was based on an improperly calculated amount by the Treasury
Department).
188. See supra Part II.
189. Dep't of the Army v. Blue Fox, 525 U.S. 255, 265 (1999).
190. See supra note 152.
191. See supra Part I.C.1.
192. See supra Part I.B.2.
193. Note that the purpose of legislative history in this Comment is to understand the
context of the legislation in order to illuminate the plain meaning of the text. The author
is not using legislative history in a manner that is most controversial with respect to its
legitimacy as an interpretive tool-using legislative history to change the meaning of the
text.
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Considering the precedent, which clearly recognizes the validity of the
surety's equitable subrogation rights, and the background and context
regarding the creation of the Tucker Act, there is enough room in Mr.
Tucker's vision of the Tucker Act to accommodate subrogation claims
brought by a payment bond surety against the United States.
19 4
194. In the context of the law's history and origins, the intended scope of jurisdiction
under the Tucker Act is broad enough to accommodate a payment bond surety's equitable
subrogation claims. Christian Mammen asserts that part of legislative history's value is
that it provides context. MAMMEN, supra note 42, at 2-3. He states, "Legislative history
conveys a certain degree of expertise and/or provides certain contextual information about
the subject-matter of the statute. Such contextual information and expertise can be
helpful in interpreting statutes (just as contextual information is often helpful in
understanding the meaning of utterances)." Id. Context is the value that legislative
history brings to the Tucker Act.
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